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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16372

-vsROGER AUDERSON and·
THOMAS E. BRACKENBURY,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants were charged with the crime of tampering
with a witness, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were tried and convicted before a jury
of the crime of tampering with a witness on January 31, 1979,
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Wasatch
County, Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, presiding.
Appellant Anderson was sentenced to serve a term not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison and fined $500.
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Appellant Brackenbury was sentenced to serve nine months in
the Wasatch County Jail and fined $500.

Both appellants

were placed on twenty-four month probation in lieu of
serving the proscribed sentence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early evening of May 28, 1978, the
appellants [Anderson and Brackenbury] entered the J & M
Saloon, owned and operated by one James E. Garner, and
located in the town of Soldier Summit, Utah.

At that

time, Anderson was Chief of Police of Soldier Summit and
Brackenbury was the Justice of the Peace for Soldier
Summit.
When appellants entered the Saloon, James
Garner and a male patron of the saloon were playing a
guitar and discussing the subject of Karate (Tr. p. 40).
Subsequently, another patron, one Ray Applegate, and Garner
took off their shoes and were demonstrating Karate moves
to each other (Tr. p. 40).

Anderson, according to

Garner's testimony at trial, then walked between Garner
and Appelgate "as though there were trouble" (Tr. p. 41).
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Appellants then moved to the rear of the bar and
seated themselves on two stools.
As appellants state in their brief (page 2) ,
the nature and content of the conversation between
appellants and Garner was a matter in controversy
at trial.

Garner testified that Anderson "got kind of

huffy about the Karate incident" and that he (Anderson)
said, "I'd better explain I'm a black belt" (Tr. p. 41,42).
After the karate incident, appellants called
Garner over to join them.

Their purposes in visiting

the saloon and in calling Garner over to talk were in
dispute at trial.

According to the testimony of Garner,

Anderson called him "down to the end of the bar and said
he had some business he wanted to discuss"

(Tr. p. 41).

Anderson testified at trial that he had "information
there was alcohol being sold"

(Tr. p. 152) and went to

the saloon to see what he could find out.
At some point during the conversation between
appellants and Garner, Applegate approached the men and
asked if he could be of assistance.

Applegate testified

at trial that he "figured there was going to be a fight."
Anderson told Applegate that he was chief of police (Tr.
p. 58) and Applegate returned to his seat.

The testimony

at trial reveals inconsistent recollections of the content
of the conversation between Applegate, Garner and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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appellants.

Appellants contend that Garner told them

"he's [Applegate] my bouncer" and Applegate testified at
trial that "Mr. Garner told him [Anderson] that I was
his bouncer . • . But I thought he was just teasing . • . I
didn't say I was anybody's bouncer" (Tr. p. 86).
Garner testified that at some point in this
~iscussion,

Anderson started using "bad language" in

front of his wife and Garner reached across the table
and "kind of slapped him."

The record does not support

appellant's contention that Anderson was "drinking a soft
drink" (Appellant's Brief, p. 3) at the time Garner
slapped him.

According to the testimony of Anderson at

trial, Brackenbury "had a bottle with him" when the two
entered the saloon.

Anderson and Brackenbury subsequently

left the premises and Anderson returned with a uniformed
policeman, one Erwin J. Curtis.

Curtis testified at

trial that Anderson appeared "excited, definitely
excited" when Anderson approached him and asked him to
go over to the bar with him.

Curtis and Anderson entered

the J & M.Saloon and proceeded to arrest Garner for
assaulting an officer.
scuffle ensued.

Anderson grabbed Garner and a

Curtis handcuffed Garner, took him outside

and placed him in the patrol car.

Curtis.then transported

Garner to the Utah County Jail (Tr. p. 102).
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Appellants state in their brief that Anderson
returned to the J & M Saloon after Garner's arrest to
"gather information and to arrest Ray Applegate for
interferring with an officer" (Appellant's Brief, p. 4). 1
Applegate testified at trial that he had consumed
"three drinks and a beer" (Tr. p. 83).

When questioned

on cross-examination by appellants' counsel as to whether
he had had "quite a bit to drink," Applegate responded, "No,
sir,"

(Tr. p. 86).

(Appelgate)
(Tr. p. 48).

Garner also testified at trial that he

"wasn't intoxicated for what he had to drink"
When Anderson returned to the saloon and

asked Applegate to "go with him," Applegate left with
Anderson and they proceeded across the street to a trailer.
According to Applegate's testimony at trial, Anderson
"shoved" him "a couple of times" as they crossed the
street and then "kind of shoved me [Applegate] in there"
[the housetrailer] where he told Applegate he was under
arrest for interferring with police officers on duty (Tr. p.
63) •

The events which occurred in the trailer were in
dispute at trial.

Applegate testified that Anderson

asked him if he saw Garner hit him and that he responded

1

It should be noted that such conduct has not had
criminal sanctions for more than three years.
See State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975).
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that he "didn't see anybody hit anybody.
at the other end of the bar"

(Tr. 64).

I was
Appellant further

testified that Anderson "grabbed me by my shirt" and said,
"Yes, you did.

Tom saw him strike me."

Applegate testified

that An.::.ersor +:hen "picked me up by my shirt, raised me up
out of the chair" and tore his shirt (Tr. 64).

Anderson

said, "let me show you judo" or something to that effect and
pushed Applegate backwards over his outstretched leg (Tr. 64).
Applegate "hit the floor" on his back.

Anderson called

Applegate a "cottonpicking dink" and said to Applegate, "I
could kill you with my bare hands, you fat --and--"

(Tr. 65).

Applegate testified that Brackenbury told Anderson to
"simmer down" and get in uniform.

Anderson returned in

uniform about twenty minutes later, during which time one
George R. Schade, the Mayor of Soldier Summit, had arrived
at the trailer (Tr. 65).
Whether Applegate had purchased liquor on the premis
of the J & M Saloon and had seen Garner hit Anderson in the
mouth was disputed at trial.

Certain statements to that

effect had been prepared by Brackenbury for Applegate's
signature.

Whether Applegate signed the statements voluntarL

was also in dispute at trial, with Appellants contending
that Applegate signed the statements of "his own free will"
(Tr. 160).

Applegate, however, testified at trial that he wi
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told to sign the statements and signed because, in his own
words, "I was scared, they had already pushed me around, and
I was scared maybe they might push me around again or beat me
up or something,"

(Tr. p. 73-74).

After Applegate signed the statements in the
presence of appellants and the Mayor, he went over to the
cafe to have breakfast and was later joined by Anderson who
told Applegate he "wouldn't recommend [him) corning back
through that area again"

(Tr. 76).

Applegate then returned

to his truck and left the town of Soldier Summit.
Curtis, the police officer who had arrested
Garner and transported him to the Utah County Jail, returned
to Soldier Summit at approximately 1:00 a.rn.

He testified

that he had a conversation with Anderson and Brackenbury in
the cafe wherein Anderson stated "I've got him now."

I've

got a statement here of him selling whiskey over the bar."
When Curtis

asked Anderson if Applegate voluntarily gave

a statement, Anderson responded that he "had to rough him up
a little bit, but [he) got the statement."

(Tr. 104).

Curtis further testified that Brackenbury said "He [Anderson)
roughed him up pr·etty good"

(Tr. 104) .

Curtis also testified

as to a conversation he had with Anderson several weeks after
the saloon incident where Curtis asked Anderson what he was

-7-
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"going to do if they find Applegate."

Anderson stated to

Curtis that "He had beat him and he was so scared . .
that the bastard or son of a bitch is still running."
(Tr. p. 104).
A subsequent investigation was made and appellants
were charge6 ·. .:.. th the crime of witness tampering of which the:
were

subs~~uently

convicted of at trial.

A preliminary hearing was held on November 28, 197!,
in the Circuit Court of Wasatch County, the Honorable E. Patri1
McGuire, presiding.

One of the State's witnesses, Ray

Applegate, did not reside in the State and was not present at
the preliminary hearing.

The State introduced the affidavit

of Mr. Applegate and move<l the court to admit the affidavit
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-19
(Supp. 1973).

The court admitted the affidavit but

imposed the condition that the State arrange to have Applegat
available one day prior to trial to afford the defendants
the opportunity to confront him (P.H.
th~

Tr. p. 17).

defendants were bound over for trial.
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Subsequer:

l\RGTJMENT

POINT I
APPELLANTS WERE AFFORDED THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY
HEARING.
Appellants assert that there is an absolute right
of confrontation and cross-examination at preliminary hearings
in Utah and that this right was violated in their case when
the committing magistrate allowed the State to invoke the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19 (1953), as amended,
and introduce a sworn affidavit to establish probable cause,
rather than call the affiant, who resided out of state, as
a witness at the preliminary hearing.

They claim that

because of the court's above ruling, they were "in effect"
denied their right to a preliminary hearing.
Respondent will show that there is no
constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination
at preliminary hearings under either the United States or
Utah

Constitutions, and at most, there is only a limited

statutory right which has been recently restricted by
the Utah legislature with the recent enactment of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-15-19, supra, which permits the use of
hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings.
Appellants concede at the outset of their
argument that there is no federal constitutional right
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to a preliminary hearing (Appellant's Brief, p. 6).

See

United States ex rel. Kassin v. Mulligen, 295 U.S. 396,
55 S.Ct. 781, 79 L.Ed. 1501 (1935).

Nevertheless,

appellants cite Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 s.ct.
854, 431 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), as suggestive of a federal
ri~ht

to a preliminary hearing.

However, the Court in

Gerstein was concerned with the issue of whether a person
arrested and held for trial under a prosecutor's inforrnation is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty.
In holding that an informal non-adversary proceeding
would suffice, the Court discussed the procedures
allowed by state statutes to determine probable cause
at a preliminary hearing such as presentation of witnesses,
cross-examination and so forth.

The Court stated:

These adversary safeguards are not
essential for the probable cause
determination.

*

*

*

This is not to say that confrontation and cross-examination might not enhance
the reliability of probable cause determinations in some cases.
In most cases, however,
their value would be too slight to justify
holding, as a matter of constitutional
principal, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be
employed in making the Fourth Amendment
determination of probable cause.
Id. at 121-122 (emphasis added).

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As the Court stated in Gerstein, the constitutional
provisions which guarantee certain

rights to the accused

in a criminal trial are not necessarily applicable to
preliminary proceedings.

See also United States v. Neff,

525 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1975).

Thus, it is clear there

is no federal constitutional right to a preliminary
hearing, nor to confrontation and cross-examination at
hearings where probable cause determinations are made.
Appellants then accurately state that there
is a provision for a preliminary hearing in the Utah
Constitution at Art. I § 13.

However, this provision

is totally silent as to the extent of procedural due
process available at a preliminary hearing.

Art. I § 13

provides as follows:
Offenses heretofore required to be
prosecuted by indictment, shall be
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
unless the examination be waived by the
accused with the consent of the State,
or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by
the Legislature.
Despite this silence in the Utah Constitution,
appellants attempt to create the impression that there is
a state constitutional right to confrontation and crossexamination at preliminary hearings.

They rely on another
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constitutional provision (Art. I
construing that provision.

§

12) and case law

However, both the provision

and the case law only apply to rights at trial and have
absolutely no application at a preliminary hearing.
Art. I § 12 provides as follows:
In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify
in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases.
In
no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not
be compelled to testify against her husband,
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Appellants confuse the constitutional guarantees afforded
the accused at trial with the procedure of the preliminary
hearing.

In each case cited by appellants in support of

their argument that as defendants they had the right to
cross-examine and confront all witnesses against them at
the preliminary hearing, the situation involved a trial
setting, not a preliminary hearing, where the right to
·cross-examination is well-settled.

State v. Mannion,
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57 Pac. 542 (Utah 1899); State v. King, 68 Pac. 418
(Utah 1902); and State v. Kendrick, 538 P.2d 313 (Utah
1975).

The right to confront one's accusers at trial

is a right guaranteed by both the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution.

In several

Utah cases, where the situation was reversed, i.e.,
rather than introducing written affidavits at the
preliminary hearing and having the witness present
at trial, the witness gave testimony at the preliminary
hearing but was not present at trial to testify, this
Court has determined that the right to confront witnesses
was not violated by allowing the testimony of the witnesses,
taken at the preliminary hearing, who were shown to be
absent from the State, to be read into evidence.

See

State v. Vance, 110 Pac. 434 (Utah 1910); State v. Inlow,
141 Pac. 530 (Utah 1914); and State v. Depretto, 155 Pac.
336 (Utah 1916).

Although the preferable practice would

be to have the witness available for cross-examination
at the trial, in the presence of the ultimate fact-finder
so that demeanor could be observed, this Court has
concluded that the absence of a witness at trial, where
testimony from the preliminary hearing is available, is
not a violation of the accused's right to confrontation.
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In Barker v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), the
United States Supreme Court stated:
The right to confrontation is
basically a trial right.
It includes
both the opportunity to cross examine
and the occasion for the jury to weigh
the demeanor of the witness. A prPliminary hearing is ordinarily a much
less searching exploration into the
merits of a case than a trial, simply
b~cause its function is the more limited
on~ of determining whether probable
cause exists to hold the accused for
trial.
Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
One year later in Berger v. California, 393 U.S.
314, 89 s.ct. 540, 21 L.Ed.2d 508 (1969)

I

the Court held

to its rationale in Barker and observed that one of the
important objectives of the right to confrontation at
trial was to guarantee that the ultimate fact finder who
determines guilt or innocence had an adequate opportunity
to assess the credibility of witnesses.
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is only
to determine whether there is probable cause that a crime
was committed and that the accused committed that
crime to justify holding the accused to stand trial.

The

preliminary hearing is not designed to be a mini-trial but
rather it is to be used as a screening device to insure
the existence of probable cause before making the accused
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stand trial.

Miller v. Dist. Ct. in and for Nineteenth

Judicial District, 566 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1977).

Nor is

it designed to afford discovery for the accused as suggested
by appellants.

Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26

(10th Cir. 1973).

While a preliminary hearing must

comply with certain requirements of due process, this
does not mean that all procedures used in a trial must
be employed.

State v. Lenehan, 471 P.2d 748 (Ariz. 1970).

Moreover, the function of a preliminary hearing
is like that of a grand jury proceeding (Utah Code Ann.
§

77-18-1 et seq., and Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-1 et seq.)

in that both procedures seek to determine the existence
of probable cause to require a person to stand trial.
Yet, it will be noted that an accused at a grand jury
proceeding has no right to even be present (unless called
as a witness), Johnson v. Superior Court of San Joaquin
County, 539 P.2d 792 (Calif. 1975), and no right to crossexamine or confront witnesses against him.
Salazar, 469 P.2d 157 (N.M. 1970).
§

See State v.

While Utah Code Ann.

77-19-3 provides that a witness testifying before a

grand jury has the right to counsel and the right not to
incriminate himself, the statute does not provide for
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses by the

-15-
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accused.

Thus, because both procedures seek only to

determine the existence of probable cause sufficient
to indict or bind over for trial, the rights guaranteed
a defendant in "criminal prosecutions," i.e., a. trial,
have no application.

Grand jury proceedings, like

preliminary hearings, are not criminal prosecutions.
Rather, they are inquests into whether there should be
a criminal prosecution against the accused.

Thus, the

constitutional rights of cross-examination and confrontation afforded a defendant at a criminal prosecution are
not applicable

to

grand jury proceedings or pre-

liminary hearings except to the extent the legislature may
grant those rights by statute.
Respondent recognizes that a defendant does have
a limited statutory right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses called to testify at the preliminary hearing
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§

77-55-10, which provides that

"witnesses must be examined in the presence of the
defendant and may be cross-examined in his behalf.
However, the statute does not necessarily require that
all witnesses must testify at the preliminary hearing,
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but rather that those witnesses called to testify
must do so in the presence of the defendant, i.e.,
witnesses cannot be examined by the judge in camera with the
accused excluded.

Moreover, the statutory right extended

by Section 77-15-10, supra, is far from absolute and clearly
may be limited by the legislature without constitutional
violation.
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In fact, this statutory right was recently narrowed and
modified by the enactment of Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-19
(Supp. 1977), which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(2)
The rule of evidence for
trial of criminal cases shall apply
at the preliminary examination,
exceot that hearsay evidence that
would not be admissible at trial
shall be admitted if the Court
determines that it would impose an
~~reasonable burden on one of the
E~r~ies or on a witness to require
tha~ the primary source of the evidence
be produced at the hearing, and if the
witness or party furnishes information
bearing on the informant's reliability,
and, as far as possible, the means by
which the information was obtained.
When hearsay evidence is admitted, the
court, in determining the existence of
sufficient cause, shall consider:
(a)
The extent to which the
hearsay quality of the evidence affects
the weight it should be given, and
(b)
The likelihood of evidence
other than hearsay being available at
trial to provide the information
furnished by hearsay at the preliminary hearing. (Emphasis added).
Thus, the legislature may giveth and the
may taketh away

legislat~

the extent of confrontation and cross-

examination available to an accused at a preliminary
hearing.

Moreover, respondent submits that these statutes

are not in conflict as appellants contend.

They may be

read together as giving a limited right to confrontation and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

cross-examination at a preliminary hearing

and should be

read together and harmonized.
The law is well settled that statutes should be
read as a whole so that all provisions can be given meaning and
made compatible if possible.

Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake

County, 568 P.2d 738 (Utah, 1977); Great Salt Lake Authority
v. Island Ranching Co., 414 P.2d 963, 18 Utah 2d 45, rehearing
421 P.2d 504, 18 Utah 2d 276

(Utah, 1966); and Andrus v.

Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 17 Utah 2d 106 (Utah, 1965).

Reading

the two provisions at issue here, it would appear that while
the accused has the right, pursuant to 77-15-10, to crossexamine all witnesses called to testify at the preliminary
hearing, the statute does not require all witnesses to be
called, as in this case where the witness resides out-ofstate, and in such situations where, in the language of the
statute, "the court determines that it would impose an
unreasonable burden on one of the parties or on a witness to
require that the primary source of the evidence be produced at
the hearing," then 77-15-19 will allow the use of hearsay
evidence, such as affidavits, to be admissible upon the
magistrate's determination of sufficient cause.
Appellants argue that a sworn affidavit is not hearsay
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12), but cite no authority to support
this position.

Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines

hearsay as follows:
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Evidence of a statement which is
made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated
is hearsay evidence
Rule 63 then proceeds to list certain items which, though
re~oanized

to be hearsay, may nevertheless be admissible

under certain

~it~ations.

Affidavits are listed as the

second exception to the hearsay rule, and are rendered
admissible to the extent allowed by statutes and rules of
procedure of this state.

Therefore, respondent submits that

the Affidavit of Ray Applegate certainly qualifies as

"Evidence of a statement" made out of court "offered to prove
the truth of the matter stated" and therefore is hearsay.
However, under the statute, this type of hearsay i.e., an
affidavit, is admissible as an exception to the general rule.
Further, the case law supports respondent's contention that
an affidavit based on one's own knowledge and belief,
submitted for evidentiary purposes, is hearsay.

See Frankl~

v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 204 P.2d 37 (Calif. 1949).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Sections 77-15-1'.
and 17 are viewed as inconsistent, general rules of statutor:
construction would validate § 77-15-19 as being controlling.
Whether one asserts the later-in-time rule, i.e., that the
last statute embodies the latest intent of the legislature
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and is therefore controlling (see State ex rel. Bird v.
Apodaca, 573 P.2d 213

(N.M. 1977), or the rule that the more

specific statute controls over the more general statute
(See Matter of Hutchinson's Estate, 577 P.2d 1074 (Alaska,
1978), and Rarnmell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah, 1977), or
the doctrine of repeal by implication where the earlier statute
is treated as being completely repealed bythe later statute
(See State v. Mcintire, 537 P.2d 1151, 22 Or. App. 161,
adhered to 540 P.2d 399, 22 Or. App. 611 (Or. App. 1975), the
provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-19 would still prevail.
In support of their claim of a right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses at a preliminary hearing,
appellants are forced to argue that Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-19
is unconstitutional on its face or at least as applied in their
case.

First, respondent has already shown that there is no

constitutional right to confront or cross-examine witnesses
at a preliminary hearing under either the federal or state
constitutions, and thus appellants' claim that § 77-15-19
is unconstitutional on its face is without merit.

Secondly,

as applied to the facts of this case, the magistrate properly
admitted the hearsay affidavit of Ray Applegate under the
statute.

Perhaps the most important factor in the magistrate's

decision was that the witness, Ray Applegate, did not reside
within the State but was a resident of Oklahoma, and the
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inconvenience of bringing him within the jurisdiction of Uta
for the preliminary hearing, combined with the expense,
appeared unnecessary in light of the affidavit and its admissibility under 77-15-19.

Secondly, the reliability of thi

hearsay evidence, in this case, a sworn statement, which if
incorrect or untrue, is prosecutable as a crime under Utah
Code Ann.,

~

.-8-502 and § 76-8-506, coupled with the fact

that Applegate would be available to testify at trial,
further supports the magistrate's decision to admit the
hearsay evidence.
Appellants

complain that the State's introduction

of the Affidavit was done to "circumvent the defendants'
rights under Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-10" and as a result,
"a valuable source of pre-trial discovery was foreclosed"
(Appellants' Brief, p. 12, 13).
Respondent asserts that there is no right to
criminal discovery.

In a recent Utah case, State v.

Niels~

522 P.2d 1366 (Utah, 1974), this Court held that the rules
of civil procedure pertaining to discovery

are inapplicabU

in criminal cases, stating:
The majority rule is to the effect
that neither statutes nor rules of
civil procedure providing for discovery
or the inspection of evidence in the
possession of an adverse party will be
made applicable to criminal cases.
Citations omitted, Id. at 1367.
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Finally,

appellants imply

that the State

sought to have the evidence introduced to "circumvent" their
rights under § 77-15-10.

Respondent would like to point

out that the magistrate accepted the State's motion to admit
the hearsay evidence pursuant to 77-15-19 with the understanding that if the motion were denied and the hearsay evidence
not admitted,

the preliminary hearing would be post-poned

to a later date and the witness made available (Prelim. H.
Transcript, p. 17).

Further, upon granting the State's

motion, the Court expressed concern over the fact

that

Applegate was not there and the following conversation took
place:
MR CALL:
I have no objection to
him talking to the witness.
I do have
some objection to us having him here
two or three days early because someone
is going to have to pay this man's
expenses.
THE COURT: Let's say the day before.
Probably you would want him in the day
before.
If the trial is set on a Tuesday
in the District Court, I don't think it
would be--surely it would be agreeable
that he could be here.
MR. CALL: Trials of this matter in
District Court are set any day in the
week wherever there's a vacancy so it
could be any time during the week.
THE COURT: Let's assume that the
procedure was compatible, I see no
reason why you should have a complaint
to Mr. Lewis examining the witness
the day before trial.
I'm not talking
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about evidence for preliminary,
we're talking about his right to
take a look at the witness, okay?
MR. CALL:

I have no objection.

Thus, the Court exercised its discretion in
admitting the hearsay evidence to establish probable cause,
and in an effort to minimize any possible harm which might
occur to

appella~ts

due to the absence of Applegate, made

arrangements with the prosecutor on the record to have
Applegate available one day prior to trial.

In summary, respondent submits there is no
constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination
at a preliminary hearing under either the Utah or the United
States Constitutions.

Moreover, there is, at most, a very

narrow and limited statutory right provided by Section
77-15-10 what has been severely restricted and modified by
the recent enactment of Section 77-15-19(2), which was
properly invoked and followed in the instant case.

Thus,

appellants were not effectively denied their right to a
preliminary hearing.

-24-
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POINT II.
UTAH CODE ANN., § 76-8-508 (1953),
AS AMENDED, IS NEITHER CONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE NOR OVERBROAD.
Appellants claim that Utah's witness tampering
statute under which they were convicted is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.
The well-established standard for vagueness
requires that a criminal statute be declared void only when
it is

so vague that "men of common intelligence must

necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."
U.S.

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269

385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926).

See also, State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah, 1952).
The test for overbreadth was recently stated by
this Court in Salt Lake City, v. Peipenburg, 571 P.2d 1299
(Utah, 1977).

In Peipenburg, a criminal case involving

the restriction of First Amendment freedoms, a challenge was
made to the ordinance on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.
In upholding the ordinance, Justice Crockett noted, in a
concurring opinion, that the proper standard in such cases
was that the statute must be "sufficiently clear and specific
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that persons of ordinary intelligence, who desire to know whu
the law is, and to abide by it, would have no difficulty in
understanding what is prohibited."

(Id. at 1300-1301).

The statute under which appellants were convicted,
Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-508 (1953), as amended, reads as
fc '.lows:
A person is guilty of a felony
of the third degree if:
(1)
Believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending
or about to be instituted, he attempts
to induce or otherwise cause a person
to:
(a)

Testify or inform falsely .

. .

Appellants commence their claim that the statute
is impermissibly vague by merely stating that certain terms
are undefined in the statute, to wit:
cause," "testify," and "inform."

"induce," "otherwise

Appellants, however, fail

to state why they feel the above terms are vague and develop
no argument on this point other than their conclusory
statement that the terms are vague because they are undefined.

It is a well-established principle of statutory

construction that common words carry a common meaning,
(See Caminetti v. United States,242U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct.l
194, 61 L.Ed. 442, 453 (1917).

The above terms have common

-26-
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usage in the English language and are found in Webster's
Dictionary and respondent submits they clearly provide
meaning to "men of common intelligence" so that they need
not guess at the meaning

and application of the terms.

See State v. Packard, supra.
The main thrust of appellants' argument for
vagueness and overbreadth, however, is their claim that the
witness tampering statute contains no mens rea element
requiring the actor to "knowingly, intentionally, willfully
or recklessly" attempt to induce or otherwise cause a person
to testify or inform falsely.

Thus, they claim that without

the inclusion of one of the above terms before the word
"attempt" in the statute, persons of common intelligence
are forced to guess at its meaning and the statute conceivably
could apply to situations of lawful as well as unlawful
conduct, thereby rendering the law overbroad.
Appellants concede at the outset of their mens
rea argument that the statute does contain an intent element
of "believing," but they argue that the term only describes
the state of mind of knowing an official proceeding is
pending or about to be instituted, and does not focus on
the terms "attempts to induce or otherwise cause" which,
they assert, are the major criminal elements of the witness
tampering offense.
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Respondent submits that the crime of witness
tampering does contain an element of mens rea, both
implicitly and explicitly, and that the word "believing"
is highly relevant to show an implicit mens rea in the
statute.

Before a person may be convicted of witness tamperir

he must believe that an official proceeding or investigation
is pending.

Then, with that knowledge or belief, he must

make an attempt to induce or otherwise cause someone to
testify or inform falsely.

The terms "attempt," "induce", as

well as "believe" are all defined in Webster's Dictionary,

~

each definition contains a notion that a person who does any
of these things, does so with knowledge or intent.
example, the word "attempt" is defined as:
effort to do

For

"to make an

. . or effect;"·to"induce" is "to move by

persuasion or influence."

Thus, when a person attempts to

induce another to lie, "believing" that an official proceedinc
or investigation is pending, it follows that these elements
work together to create an overall picture of a person who
acts consciously, knowingly, purposefully, and with criminal
intent, to induce or cause a person to testify or inform
falsely.

In short, respondent submits that it may be

presumed that when one attempts to induce or otherwise
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cause something to happen, having a prior belief of a certain
set of facts, that it is implicit, as a matter of common
sense, that tney knowingly and intentionally do so.
This common sense approach is applicable to many
criminal offenses.

For example, the statute defining the

crime of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44 (Supp., 1979), does not expressly
contain an intent element, yet it is implicit within the
statute.

Section 41-6-44(a) reads as follows:
It is unlawful and punishable as
provided in subsection (d) of this section
for any person who is under the influence
of alcohol
. . . to a degree which
renders the person incapable of safely driving
a vehicle to drive or be in actual physical
control of any vehicle within this state . • .
The predecessor to this statute was challenged

for vagueness because of a lack of an express mens rea
provision, to wit, failure of the law to state that the
intoxicated person "intentionally" or "knowingly" drive.

Yet

this Court found the criminal intent implicit within the law.
See Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (1974).
The mere fact that the statute itself does not
contain the magic words "knowingly" or intelligently" is
not fatal.

Indeed, as appellants condede at page 16 of their

Brief, a state may even make certain acts criminal which
are unaccompanied by a mens rea.
U.S. 514

See Powell v. State, 392

(1968), and State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333

P.2d 1075
(Utah,
1959).
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Thus, so long as the acts described are not
imperrnissibly vague or overbroad due to lack of an
express mens rea provision, the statute should be upheld
where the mens rea element is implicit.
In any event, respondent submits that even if
a mens rea element is not considered to be implicit within
Section 76-8-508, Utah has explicitly provided a general
mens area provision in the Criminal Code which the Legislatun
has intended to be read in conjunction with statutes not
expressly containing a mens rea.
and 102 provide

Utah Code Ann., §§ 76-2-101

as follows:

101: No person is guilty of an
offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and:
(1)
He acts intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly or with criminal
negligence with respect to each element
of the offense as the definition of the
offense requires; or
(2)
His acts constitute an offense
involving strict liability.
102: Every offense not involving
strict liability shall require a culpable
mental state, and when the definition of
the offense does not specify a culpable
mental state, intent, knowledge, or
recklessness shall suffice to establish
criminal responsibility.
(Emphasis added).
Section 102 contemplates the situation where the
statute does not specify the mens rea necessary to commit a
crime and provides that where the statute does not specify a
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culpable mental state, "intent, knowledge or recklessness"
will suffice to establish the criminal responsibility.

Thus,

although the Legislature required that each offense not
specifically designated a strict liability offense have
a culpable mental state element, the Legislature did not go
so far as to require that each statute defining a non-strict
liability criminal offense expressly contain a mens
requirement.

rea

Instead, § 76-2-102 was enacted as a general

mens rea provision to be used in conjunction with, applied
to, and read together with those non-strict liability
statutes lacking an express intent provision .
§

Thus,

76-2-102 applies much like Utah's attempt statute, Utah

Code Ann., § 76-4-101 (Supp. 1973), which is read together
with other criminal statutes to provide all of the elements
of a particular attempt crime.

For example, the crime of

attempted burglary is found by reading Utah Code Ann.,
§

76-4-101 together with § 76-6-202

(Supp., 1973).

Moreover,

even if Section 76-8-508 were perceived as not containing a
mens rea provision at all, such is totally permissible as
conceded by appellants at page 16 of their Brief.

See

Powell v. Texas, supra.
Thus, appellants were put on legal notice as to
the requisite mens rea for the crime of witness tampering.

-31-
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Moreover, it has been well established that:
[S]tatutes should not be declared
unconstitutional if there is any reasonable
basis upon which they may be sustained as
falling within the constitutional framework . . . (cites omitted) . . . and that
a statute will not be held void for uncertainty if any sort of sensible,
practical effect may be given it.
State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952).
2ee Buhler v. Stone, 533 P.2d 292, 293-294

(Utah, 1975),

and Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-807 (Utah, 1974).
In Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 2d 42, 504
P.2d 1007, 1012 (1972), this Court noted that:
It is a well-established rule of
constitutional law that where there
are two alternatives as to the interpretation of a statute, one of which
would make its constitutionality
doubtful and the other would render it
constitutional, the latter will prevail.
Additionally, Utah Code Ann., § 68-3-2 (1953), as
amended, directs that all laws and statutes of the state
should be liberally construed "with a view to effect the
objects of the statutes and to promote justice."
Assuming, arguendo, that Section 76-2-101 and 102
do not expressly provide a mens rea for the crime of witness
tampering, and assuming further that a mens rea is not deernec
to be implicit within Section 76-8-508 under a common sense
theory, the only remaining concern is whether an alleged
lack of a mens rea provision makes the statute impermissiblY
vague or overbroad.

Respondent submits that it does not.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-32-

Appellants claim that without the mens

rea

provision, the statute (1) requires men of common intelligence
to guess at its meaning and (2) feasibly covers lawful as
well as unlawful acts.

By way of example, appellants argue

that all police interrogations involve a certain degree of
compulsion and intimidation, and unless the witness tampering
law requires that an officer "knowingly" attempt
to induce or otherwise cause a person to testify
or inform falsely, he could be guilty of the crime
of witness tampering.
argument is obvious.
authority, i.e., of a

The lack of logic in appellants'
Simply stated, the mere presence of
uniformed police officer, does not

encourage or induce people to lie.
Further, the statute is presumed not to be
intended to produce results such as appellants claim are
likely, and where possible, the statute will be given a
reasonable and sensible construction.

See Curtis v. Harmon

Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah, 1978).
The statute clearly distinguishes between
legitimate police investigations and illegitimate ones.
Moreover, under the facts of this case, the
statute was correctly applied.

Appellants, in their

official capacity as Chief of Police and Justice of the

-33-
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Peace were engaged in an oppressive interrogation of Ray
Applegate over an incident which was not even a crime, i.e.,
appellants, by threatening to charge Applegate with the
non-existent crime of "interferring with a police officer,"
sought to induce or force Applegate to make a false
statement.
ResF~ndent

further submits that appellants lack

the requisite standing to raise issues of vagueness and
overbreadth.
the

That is, an application of the statute to

facts of this case was so clearly appropriate that

appellants should not be permitted to pose hypothetical
situations which have no application to their own case.
See Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d at 807-808.
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 600 (1973),
the United States Supreme Court considered a challenge to
the Oklahoma Hatch Act.

Appellants in that case claimed

that portions of the act were impermissibly vague and
uncertain.

The Court in discussing the vagueness claim

noted that the appellants were charged with "patent"
violations of the act and stated:
In the context of this type of
obviously covered conduct, the
statement of Mr. Justice Holmes is
particularly appropriate:
if there
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is any difficulty . . . it will be
time enough to consider it when raised
by someone whom it concerns.
(Cite omitted).

(Emphasis added) 413

u. S. at 609.

The Court continued:
[Elven if the outermost boundaries
of § 818 may be imprecise, any such
uncertainty has little relevance here;
where appellants' conduct falls squarely
within the hard core of the statute's
proscriptions . . .
(Cites omitted).

Id. at 608 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756
(1974), a First Amendment case, the Court noted that:

"one

to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully
challenge it for vagueness."

(Emphasis added).

has adopted the same rule as noted in Greaves,

This Court
~,

and

in State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 396 (Utah, 1975), wherein
this Court stated:
Also important to be considered •
is the principle that no one should be
entitled to challenge a statute and
have it declared void because it may
unjustly affect someone else, but could
properly do so only if his own rights
are adversely affected.
(Emphasis added).

Id. at 940.

Even if it is assumed in this case that the
wording of Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-508, supra, might be
construed in some hypothetical instances to include
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interrogations made by police officers which might perceivabi
be outside the intended scope of the statute or that it might
oe unclear in some instances whether or not a certain act
might be included, appellants' behavior clearly falls within
the intended, explicit scope of the statute.

That is,

appellants, believing an official investigation or proceeding was pending,

(as Chief of Police and Justice of the

Peace they knew better than anyone else that an investigation
was pending) , attempted to induce or otherwise cause Ray
Applegate to testify or inform falsely, to wit:

appellants

used threats and physical force to get Applegate to sign
the false statements.

It follows that appellants have no

standing on this appeal to challenge the statute on the
basis that it may have uncertain application to others.

If

uncertainty exists, it did not affect the rights of
appellants since their conduct was clearly within the conduct
the statute sought to prohibit.
Finally, it should be noted that appellants state
in their Brief, at page 18, that other states have added
to express mens rea elements to the witness tampering
statute to bolster this argument that the Utah statute is
vague and uncertain because it lacks a mens rea element.
Respondent suggests that Utah has added the mens rea element
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as well via the companion statute of Utah Code Ann.,
§

76-2-102, and thus appellants' claim is without merit.
Thus, it is apparent from the rules of statutory

construction and the above-cited case law that appellants'
claim that the statute in question, Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-508
supra, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is without
support.

Moreover, respondent submits that appellants'

actions clearly fall within the conduct sought to be prohibited by the statute and the statute, both on its face
and as applied to appellants, is clearly constitutional
and that appellants lack requisite standing to challenge
the statute on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.
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POINT III
JURY INSTRUCTION NOS. 6 AND
7 GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE
PROPER, AND THE COURT APPROPRIATELY
REJECTED APPELLANTS' PROPOSED
INSTRUCTION NOS. 2 THROUGH 6.
Appellants argue that the trial court's
jury instruction Nos. 6 and 7 were inadequate and
erroneous, and that the court committed error by not
giving appellants' proposed jury instruction Nos.
2 through 6.
Instruction No. 6, given by the trial court,
reads as follows:
Section 76-8-508 Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended, provides in
part as follows:
"Tampering with witness . . . A
person is guilty of a felony of the third
degree if:
(1) Believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending
or about to be instituted, he attempts
to induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a)
Testify or inform falsely . . . .
(R.

p.

90).

Appellants concede that the court gave a
verbatim statement of the witness tampering statute,
Section 76-8-508, supra, in Instruction No. 6 (appellants'
brief at p. 18).

However, they renew the claims raised

in Point II of their brief, that the statute was

-38-
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irnpermissibly vague and overbroad because it had
undefined terms and allegedly lacked an express
mens rea element.

Therefore, they argue that Jury

Instruction No. 6 was likewise vague.

Respondent,

therefore, refers this Court to Point II of this
brief which thoroughly deals with appellants' claims
of vagueness and overbreadth, and respondent reasserts
that the language of the statute is adequately clear,
and thus the trial judge correctly used the verbatim
wording of the statute in Instruction No. 6.

He could

have used his own words stating the offense, but
when words involved are of common usage or understanding,
which is the case here, further definition is unnecessary.
See caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917): and
State v. Jones, 512 P.2d 1262 (N.M. App. 1973).

Moreover,

undefined terms within a statute are to be given their
common usage and meaning

(Point II, supra). Thus, further

definition in the instructions would have been superfluous
and perhaps misleading.

Appellants in their brief at

pp. 18-19 again state mere conclusions as to the need
for further definition but advance no logical reasons
therefor.
Appellants also renew the claim raised in Point
II of their brief that the statute lacked a specific
mens rea provision, and thus Instruction No. 6 failed
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to cure this defect.

It should be noted, that appellants'

objections at trial to the jury instructions (see T.
217-219) did not focus on the lack of mens rea as they
now claim on appeal.

Rather, appellants objected

that Instruction No. 6 ,

11

.

[w]as not followed up

with specific instructions defining the terms that are
used in the statute."

(T. 217).

Thus, appellants

failed to preserve this issue for appeal.

In any event,

respondent again submits there was no need for additional
elucidation of the elements of the statute (Point II, supra).
and furthermore, the claimed lack of mens rea was cured
by the trial court's Instruction No. B (R. 92) which
expressly required the commission of an intentional act.

Appellants

next argue that the trial court

erred in giving its Instruction No. 7, claiming that
it presents an inaccurate statement of the law in that
the statute requires a person to induce or otherwise
cause a person to "testify or inform falsely," yet
the court used the term "make a false statement."
Instruction No. 7 reads as follows:
To constitute the crime of tampering
with a witness as it applies to the
circumstances of this case, it must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt:

-40-
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1. That the defendants believed an
official proceeding or investigation was
either pending or about to be instituted
pertaining to suspected illegal sale of
liquor by Mr. James Garner, doing business
as J & M Saloon, and
2.
That they induced or otherwise
caused Ray Applegate to make a false statement.

R. 91 (emphasis added).
Appellants would have this Court read Instruction
No.

7 in a vacuum, isolated from all other instructions.

However, the law is well-settled that instructions should
be considered in their entirety, as a whole.
McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977).

Black v.

Moreover, the trial

court expressly instructed the jury that all instructions
"are to be considered and construed as one connected
whole," and "each instruction should be read and understood
in reference to .

. the entire charge and not as though

any one sentence or instruction separately were intended
to state the whole law of the case . . • . "

Instruction

No. 16 {emphasis added).
Thus, when Instruction No. 7 is read together
with Instruction No. 6, which quoted the witness tampering
statute verbatim and required the jury to find that
appellants attempted to induce or otherwise cause
[Applegate] to "testify or inform falsely," then the
essential elements of the crime are made clear to the
jury.
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However, appellants now allege that "testify"
and ":'1form" in the court's instruction No. 6 did not
clarify No. 7 because those terms were not defined.
Yet, the definitions of those two terms which they now
espouse on appeal, are not the definitions which they
requested the trial judge to give in their proposed
jury instructions and are strained, narrow usages
designe~

to confine and limit the jury in their findings

far more restrictively than common usage or the statute
would dictate.
Appellants' proposed Instruction No. 2 reads
as follows:

"Testify as used in the statute means to

give evidence according to law."

(R. 79).

Yet on

appeal, appellants assert that the word "testify"
requires statements made "under oath or affirmation"
and cite legal sources as to the legal definition of
the word.

Although appellants' proposed instruction

makes no mention of the required "oath or affirmation"
which they now stress on appeal, appellants claim their
rejected instruction "substantially embodied" this
concept (Appellants' brief at p. 20), and imply that
their definition is far superior to a juror's
common understanding of the term.
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Respondent submits that appellants'
"unrequested instruction," now improperly argued on
appeal, only embodies one of the common usages or
definitions of the word "testify."
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979
Edition, defines "testify" as follows:
Testify:
(la) To make a statement
based on personal knowledge or belief:
(lb) bear witness: to serve as evidence
or proof; (2) to express a personal
conviction: (3) to make a solemn declaration under oath for the purpose of
establishing a fact (as in a court) • • .
The explanatory notes to Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary at page 17a, contain the following
explanation for reading the sense division of a
specific word:
Boldface Arabic numerals separate
the senses of a word that have more than
one sense:
[e.g.) quiz . • . 1.
to make fun of:
mock 2: to look at inquisitively 3: to
question closely.
Thus, the word "testify," according to
Webster's, has three meanings, only one of which is
to "make a solemn declaration under oath."

Therefore,

appellants' proposed Instruction No. 2 was unduly
legalistic and overly restrictive.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-43-

Appellants' proposed Instruction

No. 3, also

rejected by the trial court, reads as follows:
Inform as used in the statute
means to make an accusation against
another whom he suspects of the
violation of some penal statute.
(R. p.

80).

On appeal, appellants again claim for the first

time, that to "inform" also requires an "oath or affirmation."
Yet, their own proposed Instruction No. 3 clearly
embody thh concept.

did not

Nevertheless, appellants claim at p. 22

of their brief that their proposed instruction "suggested"
that an oath or affirmation be made.

The above proposed

instruction speaks for itself, and respondent submits that
the requirement of an oath or affirmation was not even hinted
in the instruction, and thus the issue was not properly
preserved for appeal.
Assuming, arguendo, that the issue is properly
before this Court, appellants

claim that under the doctrine

of ejusdem generis, the word "inform" must be given a more
specific interpretation in view of the preceding allegedly big!
specific term "testify."

Thus, they assert that to

"inform" also requires an "oath or affirmation," which again
neither their own proposed instruction required nor does
common usage.
According to Webster's

Dictionary, supra,

".inform" means "to give information or knowledge," not to
give evidence under oath or affirmation.

Respondent submits

that Webster's definition of inform would conform to the
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to the common usage in every-day parlance.
Furthermore, ejusdem generis, is applicable only
in situations where a statute lists several specific items
followed by a general catch-all phrase, usually introduced
by the words "or other."

The general phrase may then be

construed to be limited to things "of the same kind"
(ejusdem generis) as the specific items.

In this case, the

statute simply states "testify or inform;" "inform" is not
preceded by a list of words similar in kind to "testify"
and in no way could be considered limited by the word "testify."
Returning to Instruction No. 7 as given by the
trial court, respondent submits that if any party has cause
to complain of the court's use of the term "make a false
statement" rather than "testify or inform falsely," it would
be the state in that any alleged inaccuracy certainly exists
in appellants'

favor.

The Court's instruction narrowed

the more inclusive words of "testify" or "inform
falsely" found in the statute to the very specific
element of "to make a false statement" as stated in
the instruction; thus, making the possibility of
conviction more restricted.
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Finally, with respect to Jury Instruction No. 7,

respondent submits that appellants make much ado about nothing
due to the fact that under the witness tampering statute,
the ultimate outcome of the attempted inducement is really
irrelevant; the actor does not have to cause the victim to
testify or inform falsely (or make a false statement)
but merely "attempt" to induce or otherwise cause him to do
so.

Whether the victim ultimately testifies falsely or

informs falsely is irrelevant to the commission of the crime.
The word "attempt" along with other words in the
statute, is one of common meaning and usage and thus, the
statutory wording as stated in the instruction, although
narrowed to a more specific act,

making a "false statement,"

is sufficient to accurately inform the jury as to the
elements of the crime.

Further, giving of appellants'

proposed Instructions No. 2 and 3 would have been error and
may have confused the jurors as to the requisite elements
of the crime.
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Appellants' proposed Instruction No. 4 reads as
follows:
If you find that the statements
signed by Ray Applegate were voluntarily
signed by him, you must find the defendants not guilty.
Appellants argue that due to the court's failure to give
this instruction, their theory of the case was not presented
to the jury.

The law is well-settled that the defendant

should be allowed to present his case to the jury.
State v. Ohio, 457 P.2d 618, 23 Utah 2d 70

See

(Utah, 1969),

and State v. Ollison, 519 P.2d 393 (Or. App., 1974).

However,

the case law also recognizes that before the defendant is
entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the
case, there must be a certain quantum of evidence to
support that theory.
Here, appellants have injected a new, additional
and totally unworkable element into the crime of witness
tampering.

Nowhere within the witness tampering statute,

Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-508, supra, is there the requirement
that the victim involuntarily

testify or inform falsely.

Mere attempted inducement (whether by a money bribe, false
promises, etc), is sufficient under the statute to
constitute the offense.

Thus, appellants' Instruction No. 4

-47-
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was not only contrary to the law, but is grossly misleading
and socially reprehensible.

Under appellants' theory and

their proposed Instruction No. 4, a corrupt individual
could induce a person with money, favors, or other inducement
to falsely accuse an innocent person of a crime, and even
testify against that innocent persor,, and as long as the
inducement was
volun-~-~~Y

sufficient enough so that the witness

accepted the deal, the person inducing the one

actually causing the illegal conduct, could not be prosecuted
under the statute in question.

The respondent submits that

such a strained interpretation of the statute violates not
only the intent of the legislature, but also common sense.
Thus, appellants' proposed Instruction No. 4

was~

inaccurate statement of the law and was properly rejected
by the trial ccurt.

Appellants' proposed

Instruction No. 5 states:'

Should you find the statements
signed by Applegate were not voluntarily
signed, you must nevertheless find the
defendants not guilty if you also
find any of the following to be true:
1. That the statements signed
were factually correct.
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The statute in question only requires that the actor
attempt to induce someone to testify or inform falsely,
and appellants' proposed Instruction No. 5 goes far beyond
the intent of the statute and is a misstatement of the
law.

If a person attempts to induce another to inform

falsely, that person may be convicted even though

the other

person does not yield to the inducement and does not give a
false statement.

Appellants' Instruction would require an

actual giving of a false statement, and would totally ignore
the words "attempts to induce" in the statute.
Also, the proposed Instruction was not factually
supported.

Appellants threatened the victim with arrest for

a non-existent crime and roughed him up to induce him to state
that he personally had seen liquor being sold at a specific
bar earlier that evening, which he had not seen.

There was

never a change in the victim's story; he never saw liquor
being sold and there was no evidence presented at trial that
he had.
Appellant's Proposed Instruction No. 6 states:
When you are considering the
credibilities and ability to remember
of a witness you may take into consideration,
among other things, the state of intoxication
of the witness and the extent to which it has
affected his ability to remember events and
occurrences.
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Respondent submits that Instruction No. 11,
given by the trial court, more than adequately notifies
the jury of all of the factors to consider in assessing
the credibility of witnesses without inappropriately
emphasizing one factor over the other.
Smith, 543 P.2d 834 (N.M. 1975) .)

(See State v.

Instruction No. 11

reads as follows:
You are the sole judges of the
weight of the evidence, the credibility
of the witnesses and the facts.
In
considering the testimony of a witness
you may consider his appearance and demeanor,
his apparent frankness and candor, or the
want of it; his opportunity to observe, his
ability to understand and his capacity to
remember; you may consider the interest, if
any is shown, which any witness may have in
the result of the trial; and also any bias
he may have, or any motive or probable
motive which any witness may have to testify
for or against either party.
If you believe any witness has
wilfully testified falsely, as to any
material fact in the case, you are at
liberty to disregard the whole of the
testimony of such witness, except as he
may have been corroborated by other credible
witnesses or credible evidence. You are not
bound to believe all that the witnesses may
have testified to nor are you bound to believe
any witness; you may believe one witness
against many, or many as against one.
In
the light of the above observations it is your
privilege to judge the weight to be given
the testimony of the witnesses and to determine
what the facts are.
The jury heard the evidence as to Applegate's state of
intoxication at the time of the incident involved.

As

·exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses, they
were solely within their province to weigh the evidence
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and the credibility of each witness.
~,

See State v.

89 Pac. 460 (Utah 1907); State v. Green,

911 Pac. 987 (Utah 1908).

Further, the jury may

accept or reject all or any part of the witness'
testimony.

People v. Gardner, 530 P.2d 496 (Colo.

1975).
In this case, the jury received complete,
adequate and accepted instructions regarding all
criteria to be used in judging the credibility of
witnesses ininstruction No. 11.

The Court properly

rejected the superfluous proposed instruction which
would have improperly emphasized one criterium over
all others.

-51-
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POINT IV
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH APPELLANTS' GUILT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants argue that they cannot be guilty
of violating Section 76-8-508, supra, as a matter of law
because the state failed to prove certain elements of
the offense.

However, respondent submits that each of

the "alleged" elements appellant claims were not proved
are not, in fact, elements of the witness tampering
statute.

Appellants' claim is really three-fold, to-wit:
1.

The state failed to show that appellant's

written statement was "evidence given according to law
under oath or affinnation;"
2.

The state failed to show that Applegate's

written statement was subsequently used in an official
proceeding or investigation; and
3.

The state failed to show that Applegate

actually falsely informed to someone other than appellants.
With respect to appellants' first claim, much
depends on how this Court resolves the issues raised in
Point III of this appeal.

Appellants asserted in Point

III that the terms "testify" and "inform" in Section
76-8-508 must be given a very restrictive

legal meaning

to include only situations where the declarant makes the
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statement "under oath or affirmation."

Respondent has

shown in Point III that this is an unduly restrictive
interpretation of the meaning of the terms "testify"
and "inform."

Moreover, appellants' own jury instructions

attempting to define those terms, did not go that far.
Rather, appellants have asserted this new requirement or
element for the first time on appeal, and accordingly it
should be rejected.

Respondent submits that when the

terms "testify" and "inform" are given their conunon usage
and meaning, it is clear that the prosecution established
the elements of the offense of witness tampering by
showing that appellants attempted to, and in fact,
induced or otherwise caused Applegate to inform
falsely--by giving a false written statement--during the
course of Appellant~' own police investigation which
they obviously knew was pending or about to be instituted.
Appellants' next claim is that the state was
required to prove that Applegate's written statement was,
in fact, subsequently used in an official proceeding or
investigation.

Respondent submits that even if this were

an element of the offense, which it is not, that element
was proved by the state in that Appellants, by their own
admission at page 26 of their Brief, concede that they
were engaged in a pending police investigation when the
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false statement was procurred.

Thus, Applegate's

statement was, in fact, part of a pending official
"proceeding or investigation."
More significantly, however, is the fact
that actual, eventual use of the induced false
stateme;:,t in an official proceeding or investigation
is not a requirement of the witness tampering statute.
Section 76-8-508 merely provides that:
Believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending
or about to be instituted, he [the
actor) attempts to induce or otherwise
cause a person to:
(a)
Testify or inform falsely.
(Emphasis added.)
Actual use of the criminally procured statement in the
proceeding or investigation is not required.
Appellant's construction of the statute
would clearly defeat the purposes for which the
statute was

enacted~.e.,

to protect witnesses from

being harassed or threatened by officials or others
in an attempt to induce the witness to make a false
statement or to inform falsely.

If one were to accept

appellants' premise, that they were innocent because the
State failed to establish that the written statement
signed by Applegate was actually used in an official
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proceeding, then surely the statute would lead to
ridiculous results inconsistent with the purpose and
intent of the statute.

For example, under appellants'

interpretation, a policeman could literally beat a
potential witness or bribe him with money, and unless
the extracted statement were actually used in a
subsequent official proceeding, the policeman would
not have to answer for his actions under Section
76-8-508.
The statute is designed to punish even those
persons who merely attempt to induce or otherwise cause
a person to testify or inform falsely--whether this
attempt is successful or in vain is irrelevant--the crime
has been committed once the attempt has been made, not when
the false statement is given or when and if the person's
statement is used in an official proceeding.

(Of course,

in the instant case, appellants were shown to have not
only attempted the inducement but to have completed the
act.)
It is well-settled in the law that the words
of a statute must be given their common

meaning unless

it appears from the context that a different meaning
should control.

See State v. Arnett, 579 P.2d 547, 119

Ariz. 38 (Ariz. 1978); Crist v. Bishop, 520 P. 2d 196
(Utah 1974), and Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485 P.2d
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1035, 26 Utah 2d 100 (Utah 1971).

Utah Code Ann.

§

76-8-508 clearly states that a person is guilty
if "he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person
to testifv or inform falsely."

Giving those words

their ordinary meaning or common usage, appellants'
actions, upon a reading of the trial transcript and the
evidence admitted, clearly fall within the conduct subject
to criminal sanctions.
A recent Utah case, State v. Danker, No. 16200,
rendered August 22, 1979, dealt with the same statute.
In Danker, the defendant had been convicted under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-508 of witness tampering for dissuading
her seven year old daughter from testifying in court
against a male who had been charged with committing
forcible sodomy upon the daughter.

The Court noted

that under Section 76-8-508, "the state has the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt:

that the defendant

knew an official investigation was in progress; that she
knew her daughter would be a witness in any subsequent
proceedings; and that she told her daughter not to
testify."
In this case, applying this

same requirement of

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, appellants by their own
admission.had heard rumors that alcohol was being sold
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at the J and M Saloon and they were inyestigating the claim.
In their positions as Chief of Police and Justice of the
Peace, surely their efforts would constitute an
"investigation" within the intent of the statute.

The

fact that they were conducting the investigation leads
to the conclusion they knew that an investigation
was "pending or about to be instituted."

That appellants

knew Applegate could be a witness in subsequent
proceedings is obvious:

It was Applegate's statement

that would give appellants the necessary information to
proceed.

As to whether appellants "attempted to induce

or otherwise cause" Applegate to testify or inform falsely,
that evidence is a matter of record in the trial transcript
and also the version of the facts believed by the jury in
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants were
guilty.
Appellants' final claim is that the state failed
to show that Applegate was requested to inform or in fact
informed falsely to someone other than appellants.

Once

again, appellants have attempted to add a new element
to the offense which simply is not there.

There

is no requirement that the victim of the crime eventually
inform

"another" falsely.

The mere

act of making the false

statement which might eventually be used later is sufficient
even if the statement is never

actually used.

Just because
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the state discovered the attempted inducement to procure a
false statement early before it was corrununicated to another
and actually became part of an official proceeding should
not bar prosecution for witness tampering.

Further,

appellants' own proposed jury instructions did not even
suggest a requirement that the false statement be
corrununicated to someone other than defendants.
hccordin~~y,

this claim should be summarily rejected.

In conclusion, respondent submits that the
state proved every element which is actually contained
within Utah's witness tampering statute beyond a
reasonable doubt, and appellants' attempt to add
elements which are not part of the statute, and then
claim that the state failed to prove these new elements
should be rejected.
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POINT V
IMMUNITY GRANTED TO APPELLANT
BRACKENBURY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-45-21 DOES NOT PRECLUDE HIS
PROSECUTION.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-45-21 (1953), as amended,
empowers prosecutors to grant immunity to witnesses who
may be called upon by the State to support the
investigation or prosecution of a case.

The relevant

portion of that statute reads:
In any investigation or prosecution
of a criminal case, the attorney general
and any district attorney or county attorney
shall have the power to grant immunity from
prosecution to any person who is called or
who is intended to be called as a witness
in behalf of the State of Utah whenever the
attorney general, district attorney or
county attorney deems that the testimony of
such person is necessary to the investigation
and prosecution of such a case. No
prosecution shall be instituted against
the person for any crime disclosed by
his testimony which is privileged under
this action, provided that should the
person testify falsely, nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent
prosecution for perjury.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-45-21 (1953), as amended (emphasis added).
Appellants correctly state in their brief that
while two types of immunity traditionally exist-transactional
(which precludes prosecution for any transaction revealed
by his testimony), and use and derivative use (which only
precludes the use of privileged testimony in a subsequent
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prosecution, but does not preclude future prosecution),
the Utah statute leaves in question which type of
immunity exists in this state.
The most authoritative statement by this
Court on the subject of immunity is in State v. Ward,
571 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1977)

(hereinafter~).

Ward

involved the improper grant of immunity by county
attorney deputies.

The Court held that, in "fairness

to the defendant and the interests of justice . . . the
prosecution should not be entitled to rely on nor to
make use of" the testimony given by defendant Ward.
Id. at 1347.
In Ward, the majority opinion made several
significant rulings regarding Section 77-45-21,
specifically, and the status of immunity in Utah
generally.

As to the statute itself, the Court held:
Due to the considerations just
discussed as to the seriousness of the
responsibility imposed, and the fact that
it departs from the ideals of equal
justice, it is our opinion that the
power to grant immunity is of such
character that it should not be extended
by implication or otherwise beyond the
express terms of the statute.

Id. at 1346.
Thus, immunity must always be dealt with in the
most narrow and strict sense and must not be casually
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given nor received.

It must not be considered to expand

into areas of a witness' testimony unless expressly given
by the statute or the officer granting the immunity.
The court then further stated, with regard to
immunity in general, that:
The grant of immunity is supposed
to be for a quid pro quo in the form of
information from the grantee, who is or
may be involved in crime.
That is, it
is in essence a contract.
It is
fundamental that when any agreement is
entered into it should reflect a meeting
of the minds of the parties who enter
into it; and this in turn includes
knowledge of the foundational facts
out of which the agreement arises and
comes into being.
Id. at 1346.
Using the Court's analogy of immunity as a
contract in the present case, it is clear that the
parties involved had no meeting of the minds with
regards to the narrow privilege of immunity offered
to appellant Brackenbury.
Brackenbury

The transcript of the

deposition reveals the following dialogue

between Harold Call, the Wasatch County Attorney and
Jerry Ungritch,appellant Brackenbury's

attorney:

MR. CALL: Well, the County Attorney's
office will grant Mr. Brackenbury immunity
as to the testimony regarding the incident
in the bar and involving James Garner
and as to nothing else.
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MR. UNGRITCH:
Is that going to be the
limit of the scope of examination at this
time?
MR. CALL: Well, to the extent that
we're able to go beyond that in some
detail, but we have other areas we'd
like to go into, but we will grant immunity
only to the incident relating to the bar
and to James Garner and to his activities
as Justice of the Peace in relation to the
arrests and the people brought before him.
Brackenbury

Deposition at 4.

Assuming that the immunity statute authorizes
qrants of transactional immunity, the prosecution of
appellant Brackenbury does not violate the immunity
actually granted.

The County Attorney expressly stated

that immunity was granted as to the "indicent in the bar
• • • and as to nothing else."

Supra.

Later in a paragrapt:

stating that the prosecution would like to be able to
go into other things, it could be argued that immunity was
apparently expanded "to his [appellant's] activities
as Justice of the Peace in relation to the arrests and the
people brought before him." Appellants argue that this
"expansion" covered the incident in question. Appellants'
Brief at 29.

However, the "expansion," if it is

one, could only have pertained to persons arrested and
brought before appellant Brackenbury as Justice of the
Peace as illustrated by the questioning which followed
the immunity.

Appellant Brackenbury was questioned about

the bar incident, among other things, then the county at tor:
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delved into the serious concerns covered by the additional
immunity.

For example, he questioned appellant extensively

about whether persons arrested for speeding violations and brought
before him as Justice of the Peace, had alleged that they
were not speeding at all.

Brackenbury deposition at 26;

he questioned about arrested persons complaining that
they were improperly arrested outside city limits,
Brackenbury deposition at 26-27, 29; he discussed place
of arrest and the boundaries of the city, Brackenbury
deposition at 26-30, etc.
The incident for which appellant was prosecuted
did not concern an "arrest" of anyone; no one was "brought
before him" as Justice of the Peace, nor was he acting
in what anyone could consider as "activities as Justice of
the Peace."

The victim, Applegate, was never under arrest.

Appellant admits that himself.
15 and 21.

Brackenbury deposition at

The victim, Applegate, was never "brought before

him" for arraignment or for any other purpose relating
to appellant's duties as Justice of the Peace.

During

the intimidation of the victim, Applegate, appellant
was certainly not functioning in "activities as Justice
of the Peace."

Appellant himself even admits that:
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Q. How do you function as a
Judge impartial when you write the
statements of the witnesses?
A. Well, I just wrote what he was
telling me about it.
Q. As a Judge, you shouldn't even
be involved in this until it comes to
trial, should you?
A.

Right.

I understand that.

Q. Why were you writing witnesses's
statements on a case that was going to come
before your court?

A. Well, Roger asked me to write it,
and I just wrote down what the statements
was coming up to.
Q.
Would you agree now you shouldn't
have done it?

A.

Right.

Brackenbury Deposition at 23.
Thus, the additional language in the grant of
immunity could in no way apply to the incident at hand, but
to complaints by "arrested" traffic violators

or others who

were "brought before" appellant in his "activities as Justice
of the Peace."
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In addition, if the County Attorney's statement
was misunderstood by appellant Brackenbury's attorney,
the contractual grant of immunity was never properly formed
in the first place since there was no clear meeting of the
minds.

(Ward, supra).

This disagreement and misunderstanding

is apparent from the present two briefs.

No "contract" of

immunity was ever entered into (Ward, supra), and thus
appellant Brackenbury cannot claim any such privilege.
In addition, respondent urges that a careful
reading of the quoted dialogue reveals that the County
Attorney's offer of immunity appears to have gone only
to the "incident in the bar involving James Garner and as to
nothing else."

Respondent contends that the first statement

made by the County Attorney after the prodding of Mr.
Ungritch demonstrates the narrowness of the offered grant
of immunity, if transactional.

Mr. Call responded, "Well,

to the extent that we're able to go beyond that [the scope of
the offered immunity], we will."

(Deposition, at p. 4).

He

forthrightly indicated that he was prepared to question
Brackenbury as to incidents other than the events which
occurred in the bar.

His use of the phrase "go beyond that"

indicates that his idea of what he offered as immunized
testimony was not as broad as appellant argues.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities,
respondent submits that appellants' convictions and
sentences were proper and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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